Security & Hardening
SnapOtter processes images entirely on your infrastructure. No telemetry, no external API calls, no phone-home behavior. Images never leave the container.
The container runs as a dedicated non-root user (snapotter) with all Linux capabilities dropped except the minimum required set. For the full vulnerability disclosure policy and security architecture, see SECURITY.md on GitHub.
Container Hardening
The default docker-compose.yml includes production security hardening. Here is a breakdown of each option and why it matters:
services:
SnapOtter:
image: snapotter/snapotter:latest
ports:
# Bind to localhost only for internet-facing deployments:
- "127.0.0.1:1349:1349"
volumes:
- SnapOtter-data:/data
- SnapOtter-workspace:/tmp/workspace
environment:
- AUTH_ENABLED=true
- DEFAULT_PASSWORD=change-me-immediately
- RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=100
# --- Resource limits ---
mem_limit: 6g # Prevents runaway memory from crashing the host
memswap_limit: 6g # No swap -- fail fast instead of degrading the host
cpus: 4 # Cap CPU usage to 4 cores
pids_limit: 512 # Prevents fork bombs
# --- Capability restrictions ---
cap_drop:
- ALL # Drop ALL Linux capabilities first
cap_add:
- CHOWN # Needed for volume permission setup
- SETUID # Needed for gosu privilege drop (root -> snapotter)
- SETGID # Needed for gosu privilege drop
- DAC_OVERRIDE # Needed for volume permission setup
- FOWNER # Needed for volume permission setup
# --- Logging ---
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "50m" # Rotate logs at 50 MB
max-file: "5" # Keep 5 rotated log files
# --- Health check ---
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "--max-time", "5", "http://localhost:1349/api/v1/health"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
start_period: 60s
retries: 3
shm_size: "2gb" # Required for Python ML shared memory
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
SnapOtter-data:
SnapOtter-workspace:Why no-new-privileges Is Not Set
security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true] is intentionally omitted. The entrypoint starts as root to fix volume ownership, then drops to the snapotter user via gosu, which requires setuid. Once the privilege drop completes, the process runs as snapotter with all capabilities except the five listed above removed.
If you use Kubernetes or Docker's --user flag to run as non-root directly (bypassing gosu), no-new-privileges is safe to enable.
Why read_only Is Not Set
read_only: true is not set because PUID/PGID remapping writes to /etc/passwd and /etc/group at startup. If you use Docker's --user flag or Kubernetes runAsUser instead of PUID/PGID, you can safely enable a read-only root filesystem.
Network Isolation
During normal operation, the container makes zero outbound network connections. All image processing happens locally using bundled libraries.
Browser --> Reverse Proxy (TLS) --> SnapOtter container --> (nothing)The only exception is AI model downloads: when a user installs an AI feature bundle through the UI, the container downloads model files from GitHub Releases and PyPI. These downloads happen once per bundle and are stored in the /data volume.
Firewall recommendations:
| Scenario | Outbound rule |
|---|---|
| Air-gapped (no AI) | Block all outbound traffic from the container |
| AI bundles needed | Allow HTTPS to github.com, objects.githubusercontent.com, pypi.org, files.pythonhosted.org during install, then block |
| After AI install | Block all outbound traffic -- models are cached locally |
For reverse proxy configuration (Nginx, Traefik, Caddy, Cloudflare Tunnels), see the Deployment guide.
Docker Secrets
For production deployments, avoid passing secrets as plain-text environment variables. The entrypoint supports Docker's _FILE convention: mount a secret as a file and set the corresponding _FILE variable to its path.
Supported secrets:
| Variable | _FILE equivalent |
|---|---|
DEFAULT_PASSWORD | DEFAULT_PASSWORD_FILE |
COOKIE_SECRET | COOKIE_SECRET_FILE |
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET | OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE |
S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID | S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID_FILE |
S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY | S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY_FILE |
SNAPOTTER_LICENSE_KEY | SNAPOTTER_LICENSE_KEY_FILE |
Example with Docker Compose secrets:
services:
SnapOtter:
image: snapotter/snapotter:latest
environment:
- AUTH_ENABLED=true
- DEFAULT_USERNAME=admin
- DEFAULT_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/snapotter_password
- COOKIE_SECRET_FILE=/run/secrets/cookie_secret
secrets:
- snapotter_password
- cookie_secret
secrets:
snapotter_password:
file: ./secrets/snapotter_password.txt
cookie_secret:
file: ./secrets/cookie_secret.txtTIP
Docker Compose secrets (without Swarm) require Compose v2.23 or later.
Kubernetes Deployment
The entrypoint detects when the container is already running as non-root (e.g., via Kubernetes runAsUser) and skips the gosu privilege drop automatically.
Recommended Pod SecurityContext:
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: snapotter
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: snapotter
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: snapotter
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 999
runAsGroup: 999
fsGroup: 999
containers:
- name: snapotter
image: snapotter/snapotter:latest
ports:
- containerPort: 1349
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: [ALL]
resources:
requests:
cpu: "1"
memory: 2Gi
limits:
cpu: "4"
memory: 6Gi
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/health
port: 1349
initialDelaySeconds: 60
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/health
port: 1349
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
- name: workspace
mountPath: /tmp/workspace
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: snapotter-data
- name: workspace
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 2GiSince runAsUser: 999 is set at the pod level, the entrypoint skips gosu entirely. This allows allowPrivilegeEscalation: false and drop: [ALL] capabilities without conflict.
For resource sizing, see Hardware Requirements.
Backup and Recovery
All persistent state lives in the /data volume:
| Path | Contents | Critical? |
|---|---|---|
/data/snapotter.db | SQLite database (users, settings, pipelines, audit log) | Yes |
/data/uploads/ | User-uploaded files (if file storage is enabled) | Yes |
/data/ai/ | Downloaded AI model files | No (re-downloadable) |
/data/venv/ | Python virtual environment | No (rebuilt on start) |
SQLite uses WAL (Write-Ahead Logging) mode, which means the database is safe to snapshot while the container is running. A minimal backup strategy:
# Copy the database while the container is running (WAL-safe)
docker cp SnapOtter:/data/snapotter.db ./backup/snapotter.db
docker cp SnapOtter:/data/snapotter.db-wal ./backup/snapotter.db-wal 2>/dev/null
docker cp SnapOtter:/data/snapotter.db-shm ./backup/snapotter.db-shm 2>/dev/null
# Or snapshot the entire volume
docker run --rm -v SnapOtter-data:/data -v $(pwd)/backup:/backup \
alpine tar czf /backup/snapotter-data.tar.gz -C /data .AI models total up to 14 GB across all bundles. Since they are re-downloadable, exclude /data/ai/ and /data/venv/ from backups to save space. Only the database and user uploads are critical.
Compliance Artifacts
Each SnapOtter release includes the following security artifacts:
| Artifact | Format | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|
| SBOM (CycloneDX) | JSON | GitHub Release asset: snapotter-v{version}-sbom.cdx.json |
| SBOM (SPDX) | JSON | GitHub Release asset: snapotter-v{version}-sbom.spdx.json |
| Vulnerability scan | Trivy JSON | GitHub Release asset: snapotter-v{version}-trivy.json |
| Vulnerability scan | SARIF | GitHub Security tab |
| Static analysis | CodeQL (JS/TS + Python) | GitHub Security tab, runs weekly + per PR |
| Dependency review | GitHub native | Per-PR check, fails on high-severity additions |
| Python dependency audit | pip-audit | CI run log on every push |
| Security policy | Markdown | SECURITY.md in the repository |
| Dependency updates | Dependabot | Automated weekly PRs for npm, pip, Docker, Actions |
Running your own scan:
Download the SBOM from the release and scan it with your preferred tool:
# Scan with Grype using the CycloneDX SBOM
grype sbom:snapotter-v1.17.2-sbom.cdx.json
# Scan with Trivy using the SPDX SBOM
trivy sbom snapotter-v1.17.2-sbom.spdx.json
# Scan the Docker image directly
trivy image snapotter/snapotter:1.17.2INFO
The SBOM and vulnerability scan reflect the exact image published for that release. AI model bundles installed after deployment are not included in the SBOM since they are downloaded at runtime.
